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WORLD SYSTEM THEORY AND KEYNESIAN 
MACROECONOMICS : TOWARDS AN ALTERNATIVE 
EXPLANATION OF THE RISE AND FALL OF THE 
CAPITALIST WORLD SYSTEM 
Hartmut ELSENHANS* 
ABSTRACT 
A mechanistic and sometimes dogmatic interpretation of capitalism 
has kept world systems theory from attaining practic l relevance for 
social movements which try to combine the democrati management 
of society with efficiency, including the market. By using Keynesian 
macroeconomics as a basis and integrating it into a long-term Annales 
type historical perspective, the latter inspired by the work of Karl 
Marx, major aspects of these theoretical shortcomings can be 
addressed. Profit depends on rising mass incomes in contrast to rent 
which does not. Capitalism is, therefore, the unintended consequence 
of the success of the lower strata. Capitalism as a type of happy 
accident is expansive, but can be transferred to other societies only if 
the empowerment of labour is successful. In the current process of 
globalisation there remain various risks whereby labour becomes 
disempowered, both in developing and developed capitalist economies. 
In addition, underdevelopment hits back and disempowers labour in 
the most technically developed countries. As such, a global strategy of 
labour is required which may, nonetheless, be impleented locally, as 
exchange rate adjustments protect the socially succe sful cases from 
destruction through a race to the bottom. The necessity of such a 
strategy is based on policies currently being impleented in an 
attempt to relaunch growth and overcome crises which are characterised 
by a narrow and empirically unfounded dogmatism. Such a 
mobilisation will not, however, threaten the income and employment 
position of workers in the North, via the demands and higher 
competitiveness of workers from the South, as differences in labour 
costs are mediated through the exchange rate. 
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 Capitalism is associated in most mainstream discussion  with 
exploitation. It raises labour productivity and increases surplus 
production so that polarisation increases, even if some improvements 
in the conditions and material well being of labour are accepted in 
order to maintain “system stability” in the interest of the dominant 
capitalist class and its “organic allies” i.e. the middle strata of various 
forms. Consequently, the transition to capitalism depends on the 
availability of surplus. A historical blockage of this transition can be 
explained by the absence of sufficient surplus or the incapacity of the 
surplus appropriating class to use the surplus for accumulation. 
Accordingly, this can be explained by specific characteristics of the 
dominant class as accumulation is normally expected to provide 
ultimately higher returns. In terms of the standard German historical 
school of thought, or in Marxist theory, accumulation is conceived of 
as depending on the availability of a surplus and the often poorly 
explained historical process, in the wake of which, capitalists emerge 
as a new surplus appropriating class. Their superior capacity for 
generating new surpluses on the basis of a surplus already 
appropriated, ultimately provides them with the power to remove the 
fetters which other surplus appropriating classes had been able to 
impose on them. Capitalism is hence the result of a process of 
civilisation1 which pre-capitalist classes can delay but not definitively 
block. The process of improving mastery over nature inj cts into the 
existing social structure new resources and opportunities which lead to 
new arrangements for exploiting labour. In the wake of this process, 
new practices by social classes emerge: new developm nts in the 
productive forces destroy the inflexible relations of production in 
Marx’s continuous process of the rise and ultimate defeat of classes 
that were initially progressive. Where capitalism has not yet become 
dominant, or capable of dissolving pre-existing arrangements, it will 
ultimately be able to generalise capitalist relations f production, even 
if pre-capitalist structures happen to remain in place, albeit in a 
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subordinate and instrumentalised manner. 
Where capitalism has crossed this threshold and is generalised it 
continues to be characterised by intensifying contradictions which 
lead to revolutionary situations with the potential for transition, but 
also to the failure -as evidenced by a great deal of 20th century 
history- of that theoretically deduced and predetermined revolutionary 
actor: the working class. In situations of 'wrong consciousness', it has 
been possible for an alienated working class to fail to exploit the 
potentiality of these contradictions which capitalism presents. History 
then ends in “barbarism” rather than making a transition to socialism.2 
In the model of historical materialism developed on this basis there 
is an assumption about the automatic character of the emergence of 
capitalism which lends credibility to its other side, the expectation of 
the equally automatic character of its demise. By making capitalism 
inevitable, historical materialism also inscribes into the “laws of 
history” capitalisms own demise. 
Despite a basically Marxist approach to society and l rge parallels 
in viewing the past historical process, my model differs from 
historical materialism: it rejects the automaticity of the emergence of 
capitalism and its ultimate crisis. As such, the practical issue is not the 
overcoming of capitalism but its continued adaptation o the challenge 
of increasingly satisfying mass needs-which is a social reformist and 
not a revolutionary perspective. I do not deny, here, an indebtedness to 
a Marxian analytical perspective although I reject many elements, 
including major tenets, of Marx's economic theory. 
My essential point of divergence from Marx consists in a 
Keynesian theory of profit. Following Marx, capitalsm depends on 
profit, and profit is a special type of surplus which is appropriated 
under conditions approaching perfect competition in perfect markets. 
Profits, however, can be earned in competitive markets only if there is 
“enough” demand. Therefore, the appropriation of surplus as profit 
requires rising demand, which is not automatically provided by the 
capitalist system as assumed by Say.3 In addition, the available surplus 
is not automatically used for investment, and whether it is “wasted” on 
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luxury consumption, or used for military spending or investment, does 
not depend primarily on culture but on power relations within a given 
society. Therefore, rising demand has ultimately been provided by 
rising mass incomes through the empowerment of the masses -as 
proletarianized workers, or as petty commodity producers- and this 
idea is the essentially Keynesian aspect of my approach.  
Capitalism depends on the empowerment of labour which does not 
result from technical progress, i.e. the mastery of man over nature. 
Consequently, technology transfers and financial resources may not 
necessarily lead to a transition to capitalism. Capitalism remains 
unstable under the condition of the empowerment of labour, as its 
fragmented dominant class has no possibility to overcome its 
immediate interests -determined micro-economically- and of 
following its true long-term interest -determined macro-economically- 
i.e. maintaining control over the conditions of the system. This is 
associated with a representation of capitalism in the ideological sphere 
which does not take into account these macro conditi s. The macro 
conditions of capitalism are typically not represented at the discursive 
level, especially as these conditions are imposed by the social 
practices of the working class which itself fails to strive for 
ideological hegemony in terms of a counter-interpretation of 
capitalism which would reject the interpretation of the ruling capitalist 
class. As long as labour remains both vulnerable and powerful enough 
to impose its “Brechtian” preference for “food before morale”, its 
domination by the ruling class via a (false) perception of capitalism 
may be kept in check by the real social processes of the working class, 
a stance that Lenin had criticised as “trade-unionist” i.e. the “ouvrierist 
conscience” (Lenin 1905: 435-46). Therefore despite increasing 
“prosperity” labour may, nonetheless, become disempowered by 
tendencies which develop within “central” capitalism, such as: post-
materialism at the discursive level, an increasing propensity to save at 
the socio-economic level, an increasing social differentiation at the 
socio-structural level, as well as “globalisation” at the world economic 
level which taps cheap labour on the world labour market through 
devaluation (even when it may be paid high real wages). 
On the basis of these tendencies I argue that the actual issue of 
preserving existing levels of the empowerment of labour requires its 
generalisation at the global level. This also requires an “ideological 
equilibrium” in favour of an increasingly differentia ed “camp” of 





labour. The alternative consists in the transformation of capitalists into 
new rentiers under formally democratic conditions with overarching 
ideologies which impose the acceptance of inequality nd exploitation 
in the name of preserving democracy. 
The importance given to the unintended results of labour scarcity 
implies an important divergence from the Brenner solution to the 
transition to capitalism: the “subalterns” may be able to impose their 
personal freedom due to political factors and a degree of organisation 
(Brenner 1976: 57) without an alternative overarching social project 
just by blocking the dominant strategy of restricting personal liberty, 
the latter inhibiting the play of market forces. However, even if this 
mere political resistance can be sustained in the long term it matters 
only on the basis of labour scarcity. When the enhanced prosperity of 
society finally removes scarcity, the political dimension has to grow 
and take over the capacity of “appropriating” the society by society, 
i.e. by managing society and economics democratically or what could 
be called democratic appropriation.  
This article presents a essentially Keynesian argument as follows: 
on the basis of simple macroeconomics, the link betwe n net 
investment spending (the basis of profit) and rising demand 
(ultimately rising mass incomes) is established as a configuration 
which is intrinsically unstable. This configuration is not the necessary 
result of an inevitable historical process of development or civilisation 
but accidental in the sense that many possible causes contribute to the 
emergence of a configuration where labour is empowered so the 
imposition of rent is reduced. As capitalism ceasele sly searches 
produce products more cheaply -a mechanism basically triggered by 
comparative advantage- it penetrates other societies w thout creating 
the same favourable configuration for labour, so that 
underdevelopment, and as a reaction to it, rent appropriation and 
centralisation occur. The result is the existence of str ng forces in the 
actual processes of globalisation, as well as in industrialised countries 
which disempower labour and therefore threaten capitalism. This 
article presents an overall approach to this dilemma, the 
comprehensive character of which requires the inclusion of a large 
variety of problematiques. Corresponding to Marx’s concept of 
totality, in a given structure any particular element can only be 
adequately presented by relating it to a universal perspective of which 
it is a part. Here I will therefore concentrate on the main aspects of a 




model on which I have been working for some 30 years (Elsenhans 
2007, 1979), and which it is hoped will form the basis of a multi-
volume publication. 
As such, this article opposes the major approaches in world system 
thinking which currently are predominant. Actual world systems 
thinking is characterised by the absence of coherent economic 
explanations. Where economic foundations to an argument are 
proposed they draw on relatively crude versions of Marxism. This 
lends weight to a rejection of any explanations based on economic or 
politico-economic foundations and favours an alternative approach 
along the lines of the “cultural turn”. 
1- PROFIT DEPENDS ON INVESTMENT SPENDING 
Profit is a specific form of surplus which does not just imply the 
capacity of the powerful to exploit labour. Markets xisted long before 
capitalism. Already in the 18th century there were many non-European 
societies with high levels of monetisation (Deyell 2010) and 
“marketisation” (Bengal) which, even despite manufactured exports 
(Mukherjee 2011: 144) or despite being free from domination by 
European colonialism, were unable to achieve a transitio  to 
capitalism. Only under capitalist conditions is the bulk of economic 
surplus distributed via nearly perfect markets, although this does not 
depend on the contagious spread of market regulation, but on 
something else.  
The predominance of profit is an important distinction between 
capitalism and all other modes of production: it implies that access to 
profit is based on efficiency in using scarce resources (including 
labour), on attending to the demands of customers, and on 
reinvestment of profit in innovation. These microecnomic conditions 
for profitability determine the share of each competing enterprise in 
the total amount of profit, but it does not determine the total amount of 
profit available for the profit-making capitalist class. 
In standard Keynesian macroeconomics, total profit depends on 
spending on investment goods4. In a theoretical capitalist society there 
are only two classes, workers and capitalist. All workers, including the 
managers, receive wages (W) which they spend in their entirety on 
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consumption goods. Capitalist enterprises (and their owners, including 
their managers) receive profits which they do not spend on 
consumption goods. The proceeds from the sales of consumption 
goods equal the wages (C=W). If producers in the consumption goods 
industry make a profit above the wage bill (Wc) incurred in the 
production of wage goods including their inputs and replacement of 
equipment (amortisation), there have to be wages which have not been 
earned in the production of these goods. If consumption goods 
producers can sell the total of their production at a profit, there have to 
be wages which have not been paid in the production chain of the 
consumption goods producers. If the government sector and foreign 
trade are in balance, these wages can only have been paid to workers 
who were employed in investment goods production at a production 
level higher than the replacement of worn out equipment, hence net 
investment. Net investment goods production (gross investment minus 
amortisation) determines the amount of profit. 
Under the limitations of the model, total sales of the consumption 
goods producers correspond to the total amount of salaries in the two 
departments C=W=Wc+Wi. Each single consumption good leads to 
labour costs and inputs costs which in turn also represent costs of 
labour and inputs expended. All products which enter consumption 
goods production -the steel used for forks just, or the flour used for 
bread- are counted in national income statistics as p rt of the 
consumption goods chain. Hence, by definition, all costs associated 
with chain of consumption goods are represented by wages, as all 
inputs can ultimately be reduced to the cost of the labour which was 
necessary for their production so that C= Wc+Pc . From C=Wc+Wi and 
C=Wc+Pc follows Wi=Pc. 
As by definition I=Wi+Pi, and hence also I=Pc+Pi=P. 
The consumption goods producers may make a profit on their 
capital (Kc) which corresponds to a certain positive rate of pr fit π 
=Pc/Kc. Investment goods producers will not engage their own capital 
(K i) in investment goods production if they do not make a rate of 
profit comparable to consumption goods production, as individuals 
commit money only to the most profitable uses. Investment goods 
producers cannot be kept from entering consumption goods production 
as they posses the necessary technical knowledge in th  form of their 
capacity to produce machinery for consumption goods production. 
They will either leave investment goods production, creating scarcity 




of investment goods, or charge prices at which profit rates in 
investment goods production are comparable to the profit rates in 
existing consumption goods production.  
Capitalists themselves determine the amount of profit (Kalecki 
1971: 13) in the case of competing spending on consumption goods 
through forced savings in the form of price rises for these goods 
(Keynes 1936: 79–81, 1976: 171). Physically, labour can make use of 
consumption goods only. If total consumption demand exceeds the 
capacity of production for the consumption goods industry, any 
further increase in monetary resources for consumption cannot 
increase real consumption but triggers additional ivestment, hence 
additional wages in investment goods production, in order to increase 
production capacity. Consumption by labour cannot threaten profit in 
the real economy regardless of the level of income at its disposal. 
It is investment spending which is the decisive variable for the 
labour market. Keynes has argued, therefore, that the management of 
the global level of investment should not be left to private enterprise 
with its parochial outlook on specific markets, butrather it should be a 
state responsibility, even undertaking spending on n -productive 
activities in order to trigger off investment spending via additional 
demand (1936: 131). This explains why Keynesianism is less 
concerned about the efficiency of state spending. State spending is 
justified through its impact on market guided investment spending, not 
on its own contribution to the rise in productivity. 
2- PROFIT DEPENDS ON RISING MASS INCOMES  
Investment spending requires additional consumption, meaning 
additional mass consumption under capitalist conditions and, hence, 
the empowerment of labour. 
In his critique of Marx’s law of the Tendential Fall in the Rate of 
Profit, Bortkiewicz (1907: 455–7), followed later by Okishio (1961), 
and confirmed by Samuelson (1972), rightly argued that new 
technology under capitalist conditions can only be introduced if it 
reduces unit costs for existing products (or comparable products 
which replace them). The production of totally new products which 
address new needs and do not replace older products already implies 
rising incomes. In the production of old products, the Bortkiewicz 
criterion implies that the rise in productivity is always sufficient to 





compensate for the effects of the rise in the organic composition of 
capital on the rate of profit, as long as the natural conditions of 
production do not deteriorate. With any innovation, the total volume 
of direct and indirect labour (employed in investment goods 
production) decreases in relation to the volume of pr duction. With a 
stable wage bill and hence stagnant real wages, any rise in the organic 
composition of capital implies a rising rate of surpl s.  
Neoclassical, classical and Marxist economists assume that rising 
surpluses facilitate accumulation and contribute to gr wth. On the 
basis of the Bortkiewicz argument, this can be proven to be wrong, 
and with it, Lenin’s theory of accumulation (1899: 42) on the basis of 
the demand from department I (investment goods industry). As 
capitalists are punished by financial losses following from inefficient 
investment they opt to avoid investment in order that t e productivity 
of existing capital remains high. In the absence of rising wages, 
accumulation, therefore, implies an explosive growth of production. 
The rate of growth in capital stock (K) implies a positive rate of 
growth in net output (Y). We assume stagnant real wages (W) and 
stable availability of labour. Net output equals wages (W) and 
investment (I). The increase in production can be described as 
yY=wW+iI, where the small letters indicate the growth rates of the 
aggregates described with the capital letters. With w=0, i>y, and 
consequently k>y and, at a constant capital productivity, kt-1=yt . 
According to Bortkiewicz, because of this relation there is y1< y2<y3 
with non-declining capital productivity (and a stable or declining 
capital-output ratio K/Y=b), . From period to period, the effect of 
i1<i2<i3 also implies k1<k2<k3, and k1=y2 and y2<y3<y4. with constant 
capital productivity. The relation that if y<i, also y<k is proven by the 
following equations. If i>y, the share of investment in national income 
increases from period to period 
(1) I0/Y0 < I1/Y1 … It-1/Yt-1 < It/Yt 
As the capital stock can be defined as net product (Y) multiplied by 
the capital-output ratio K/Y= b, the inverse of thecapital productivity  
(2) K0 = bY0; K1 = bY1 … Kt–1 = bY1–1, Kt = bY0 
From (1) and (2) at constant capital-output ratio we get, because of 
i t > yt = kt 
(3) I0/K0 < I1/K1 … It–1/K t–1 < It/K t 
As I/K is the rate of accumulation k (3) implies 
(4) k1 < k2 < k3 … kt-1 < kt 




On the basis of realistic values for the initial share of investment in 
total production (around 10%) and the initial capitl output ratio 
(between 1 and 2), the required increase in labour productivity, hence, 
technical progress at a constant working population and number of 
output hours becomes unsustainable because of the rapid exhaustion 
of available new technologies which can fulfil the Bortkiewicz 
criterion (Elsenhans 1986: 269-271, Elsenhans 1994: 423-427). 
Accumulation can go on if productivity increases sufficiently, or if 
the surplus for financing accumulation is limited. Under capitalism, 
financial surplus is limited to the extent of technical progress. 
Empirically, this is shown by the relative stability of the capital-output 
ratio5. Historically, it can remain within narrow limits in capitalist 
regimes when compared to the corresponding coefficints in centrally 
(real socialist)6 or even partially (state-class dominated) planned 
economies of the East or the South7. The external appearance of 
capitalist production as characterised by the use of more and more 
expensive equipment is not evident: the increase in capital stock 
measured statistically indicates the value of the capital stock in prices, 
i.e. monetary values, and not in labour values. These monetary values 
increase because with rising real wages a capital good which requires 
a given amount of labour time, and hence can be assumed to have a 
given labour value, becomes more costly in monetary e ms. By 
deflating the capital stock of Germany by the real w ge index, the 
value of the stock of capital does not increase. This follows the 
constant capital-output ratio when observing the constant share of 
wages in national income.  
Modern “endogenous” growth theory has integrated this Keynesian 
idea of a stable capital-output ratio into a neoclassical framework by 
attributing capitalist growth not to increases in physical capital (which 
capitalists can own) but to labour skill (which capit lists have 
difficulties in appropriating as property)8. This explains the difficulty 
in defining “human capital” (the concept under which these skills are 
integrated into modern growth theory, Blaug 1976: 839; Groot & 
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has made this the basis of his theory of the authoritarian turn in his bureaucratic-
authoritarian state. 
8 As an example among many others: Cesarotti 1999: 788 f. 





Oosterbeek 1994: 320). As such, capitalist growth is neither “capital 
intensive” nor does it exhaust capital. The “residual” to which modern 
growth theories attribute growth (Denison 1967), is the result of 
greater productivity from more innovative or creative workers than 
average workers. These innovative workers are sufficiently numerous 
so that they are unable to capture the result of their own productive 
efficiency in the form of personal income because such labour, i.e. 
there own labour, is not scarce. This may be due to the fact that there 
are many who prefer this type of work over tedious work even if they 
are not “paid” the difference in efficiency in relation to non-innovative 
workers via correspondingly higher real wages. 
Limits to higher surpluses imply higher mass incomes and this 
favours a particular type of technical progress9. Technical progress 
may be oriented towards the excellence of the product as represented 
in the work of an artist, but it may also strive for a reduction in the 
cost of producing large quantities of a standardised tem. The search to 
reduce the cost of an item by mechanisms which can be replicated 
precedes capitalism, e.g. the pottery wheel or the handloom. An 
increase in mass demand for items increases motivati n to develop 
machines which allow for the rationalisation of production. Initially, 
virtually all new products are a luxury. Its consumption is democratised 
when entrepreneurs perceive a large enough potential demand that 
costs can be brought down through standardisation and production in 
large series. Hence capitalist technical progress is favoured if 
consumption is focused on an increase in the variety of standardised 
products. It is mass consumption that propels this process. 
Capitalist growth depends, therefore, on rising mass consumption 
in order to limit the growth of surplus. Surplus is not only available 
for investment but also for waste because the amount necessary for 
investment is limited. The appropriation of surplus in the form rent 
implies distortions of the productive apparatus in favour of luxuries 
and the protection of the privileged class from competition. Rising 
mass incomes, however, lead to increased potential for the production 
of investment goods which provide higher levels of employment. This 
in turn contributes to higher overall rates of total demand via technical 
progress in the form of mechanisation and standardis tion utilised in 
large scale production. 
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The hope of providing the additional demand from other economic 
formations, such as in Rosa Luxemburg’s (1912: 274) natural 
economies (initially inside, and then outside during the imperialist 
phase) can be fulfilled only to the extent that these non-capitalist 
economies are able to increase purchasing power from the capitalist 
economies or get loans from them. The latter is only a temporary 
possibility because of the ultimate limits to indebtedness. 
Profit may be regarded by the critics of capitalist exploitation as a 
surplus which is extorted from the oppressed masses a  in the case of 
rent, and this is a major theme in the standard version of anti-capitalist 
rhetoric. In reality, capitalist profit can be appro iated by the rich 
only through the utilisation of resources for investment. Obviously 
capitalists try to overcome these obstacles to enrichment, and 
therefore they rarely defend capitalism but prefer mechanisms to 
reduce competition and thus generate an opportunity to ncrease rents.  
The basic condition of capitalist growth is hence dscribed as 
follows: (i) capitalist investment takes place on the basis of improved 
technology; (ii) this leads to an increase in the productivity of labour; 
(iii) the consumption of the additional output depends on rising mass 
incomes; (iv) rising mass incomes limit the surplus available for 
investment and present new opportunities for investm n  spending 
through potential new employment (and production) of physical 
capitals. 
This does not imply that capitalists themselves impose such 
limitations on the available surplus, it simply means that they cannot 
avoid it. This inability to block the empowerment of labour is a 
precondition for the transition to capitalism. Such empowerment may 
be favoured by political conditions, but this author, at least, doubts 
that merely political empowerment can last. Political pressure always 
implies organisation and the operation of the “iron law of oligarchy” 
(Michels 1925: 182 f.) to which labour can respond only by 
withdrawing its participation. Withdrawal is a condition for being 
heard (Hirschman 1975: esp. 35) as long as participa on is necessary 
within hierarchical organisations for making the importance of 
numbers felt against resourceful minorities. Marx’s critique of the 
freedom of labour in a capitalist society presents a key. The doubly 
free proletarian (Marx 1867: 742) will reject bonds of dependence (but 
also protection) as an unfree labourer only if he has a reasonable 
chance of finding a job. This condition is fulfilled if average skilled 





labour succeeds in regularly producing more than its cost of 
subsistence/reproduction. When an exploiter can use the fruit of a 
worker's labour for purchasing other labour, the worker will be 
employed without pleasing the employer. The simple fact that his 
product sells at a price where the employer can still purchase more 
labour power is the basis of the employment of such a worker, which 
is to say he can be exploited. If the employer can use the fruit of 
worker's labour only for his own consumption, the worker will be in 
the situation of Smith’s (1776: 368) dancing girls dancing for the non-
innovative landlord, and have no negotiating power of their own10. 
Apart from political power, labour can be considered as 
empowered when even the least productive labour yields a surplus for 
those in control of the means of production. Those in control of the 
surplus may maintain less productive labour if it produces less than its 
product yields on the market, as it may provide them with non-
economic services, as characteristic of the structues where 
hierarchical positions do not depend only on economic resources: i.e. 
most pre-capitalist societies. If such non-economic interests in the use 
of labour (not for production of marketable goods but personal 
services) are no longer pursued (e.g. because of intensified economic 
competition in the wake of the penetration of capitlis  mechanisms 
from the outside) those in control of the surplus may, however, also 
shed marginal labour for economic reasons as argued in Marx’s theory 
of primitive accumulation (1867: 744). In that case, marginal labour 
which cannot produce more than its cost of reproduction either starves 
or is politically powerful enough to impose new forms of access to the 
means of subsistence. So while political power may be a complementary 
factor it has a less decisive impact on the empowerment of labour than a 
marginal product higher than the cost of reproduction. 
The model used in this argument is based on Keynesia  
macroeconomic theory. It does not, however, have the same focus as 
almost all post-Keynesian thinking which is oriented around the 
problematic of how monetary policies, and hence governments, can 
maintain effective demand at a required level. It does not participate in 
the debate on the operation of the financial sector. Admittedly, there 
are a large variety of mechanisms which can be usedto temporarily 
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26). 




support demand deficiencies under unstable conditios. But the 
Keynesian argument for the active role of money does not imply that 
monetary policy is capable of overcoming an effective demand 
deficiency in any possible situation. Historically, monetary policy has 
demonstrated greater efficiency in preventing an economy from 
overheating as opposed to stimulating investment, tha  is to say, it has 
been more effective in slowing demand rather than promoting it. My 
model is based on the assumption that there are situations where such 
techniques are not sufficient to overcome socially conditioned 
structural imbalances. 
In criticising the capture of Keynes’s innovative contribution by 
monetary Keynesians such as Hicks or Harrod, Hamouda (2009: 12) 
shows that Keynesianism is not primarily a set of instruments to 
influence demand via monetary and financial policies, but aims at 
increasing productive investment. Hamouda’s argument parallels my 
own when he states: “the propensity to consume is the driving force to 
ensure a sufficient level of investment,” and concludes that 
consumption has to be strengthened by the distribution of income 
towards those with lower incomes. 
Because I share Hamouda's rejection of the centrality of managing 
the demand for investment technically, I have deliberately chosen a 
model which is methodologically simple and which keeps open for 
discussion questions about the social and political conditions for 
mechanisms which are primary for maintaining appropriate levels of 
effective demand, and hence for the political and social conditions of 
capitalism. At the meta-theoretical level, this implies that the capacity 
of the economy for self-guidance depends on its embeddedness in 
social and political conditions which do not automatically emerge 
from the economy, nor are they necessarily maintained by it. Here is 
the link between economy and political system -this central aspect of 
political economy- and hence the meta-theoretical basis of the whole 
argument presented in this contribution. 





3- ON THE BLOCKAGE OF PRE-CAPITALIST FORMATIONS : 
CAPITALISM IS NOT PRODUCED AUTOMATICALLY BY A 
PROCESS OF CIVILISATION ACCOMPANIED BY BETTER 
TECHNOLOGY AND ENHANCED SOCIAL STRATIFICATION 
Social differentiation and technical development as de cribed in 
the history and the typology of pre-capitalist societies will not 
necessarily lead to the empowerment of labour and capital 
accumulation.  
At low levels of technical development, marginal productivity will 
fall below the cost of subsistence. As population grows more people 
can be supported only by increasing the number of workers who are 
employed on fertile land or by shifting part of the labour to less fertile 
land where the result of labour is even lower. An illustration of this 
would be the periodically occurring famines in pre-capitalist societies. 
Labour is scarce if marginal product in agriculture is higher than the 
cost of reproduction so that even marginal labour yields a surplus. 
Even the least productive worker will be sought after by those in 
control of complementary means of production in order to increase 
their resources. Hence, capitalism depends on the removal of marginal 
labour. 
Capitalism is not a “necessary” product of an evoluti nary process 
of the development of productive forces (the increasing control of 
humankind over nature), because even cumulative technical progress 
does not necessarily lead to the empowerment of labour, as not all 
forms of technical progress lead to an increase of the marginal product 
of labour in the production of mass consumption goods resulting in 
increased scarcity of labour and greater negotiating power.  
For my demonstration I will make a number of very simple 
assumptions for which anthropologists universally find confirmation. 
The will of humans is devoted to reducing effort in relation to the 
outcome of their endeavours; and humans normally prefer their kin to 
other humans, including members of the group they belong to. 
With the transition from hunting and gathering, surpl s inevitably 
has to emerge, because producers cannot reliably forecast conditions 
such as the weather. In order to be on the safe side, producers have to 
plant more fields than are needed for a normal harvest so that the 
actual harvest will produce enough for subsistence. Therefore, on 
average harvests exceed the level of subsistence. The resulting surplus 




is not simply discarded, however, and its management requires some 
sort of social organisation where cooperation can be expected to lead 
to economies of scale, to cooperation in storing and protecting a 
surplus, and this even if there is no cooperation in production.  
Humans distinguish different types of work as characterised by 
requiring different amounts of effort. Cooperation with whatever 
specialisation therefore requires the solution of the problem of 
reducing different types of concrete labour to equally demanding 
abstract labour with respect to time and effort. Under capitalism, the 
measurement of such differences is assumed to be realised through the 
labour market. There is no such labour market in pre-capitalist 
societies; just like in socialist economies standards of comparison 
have to be negotiated politically. Furthermore, opting out from 
cooperative work is costly if the cooperation allowed for economies of 
scale. Opting out becomes attractive only if differences in 
remuneration become utterly unfair. There are many solutions where 
the less favoured members are still worse off if they opt out. 
The preference of humans for those close to them, often kinship, 
explains why rights -property rights in connection with resources like 
land or water, but also “rights” in social relations as offices- are 
claimed to be hereditary, so that the distinction and ny differences 
become entrenched and even recognised by others. Kinship as a 
system of relations is more reliable than other system  of relations in 
that social roles in kinship are less likely to be challenged. Kinship 
thus offers a fairly stable system of intergenerational transfer of 
acquired privileges or “rights” which leads to a general preference for 
hereditary succession. 
In struggles based on claims with difficult exit opti ns, many 
criteria may be proposed in order to increase the particular claim of 
any participant in the negotiation. The literature on stratification 
mechanisms in African communitarian structures is full of them: age, 
gender, lineage, etc. The early development of property rights as the 
right to usufruct of some asset in nature -such as a property rights to 
nearby land or water which reduces time spent on tra sport- is an 
example of the attempts to stabilise privileges once they are acquired. 
They allow the limitation of influence by other more powerful 
claimants and their right to demand services which are deemed as 
unfair. By this way property rights simplify the negotiations which 
take place to establish rates of exchange. 





Those who benefit from a criterion for privilege will tend to 
sanctify it by linking it to the non-visible world. Comte’s (1963: 32) 
perspective of magic in early stages of development is still relevant 
where it is related to low levels of control over nature. Conquest and 
magic are vehicles for enhancing existing distinctions, as well as for 
establishing new distinctions and providing stability and control over 
existing distinctions. 
As long as economic activities are oriented predominantly towards 
food production, the importance of the complementary factor of 
production of “fertile land” (including irrigation) implies that 
increases in labour input lead to a declining rate of growth in 
productive output. Production growth diminishes in relation to 
population growth. This aspect is formalised in my arginality cum 
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With population growth marginal product decreases. Additional 
labour produces a surplus up to the level of activity A1. The product of 
additional labour falls below the cost of reproduction at any level of 
employment beyond A1. Those who produce less than their cost of 
reproduction are called marginal. Marginality means the existence of a 
considerable amount of labour which produces less than its cost of 




reproduction. The level of population where marginal product equals 
the cost of reproduction is called the threshold of marginality. 
Population growth cannot exceed the level A2; beyond this level some 
population will starve even in the case of an egalitarian distribution of 
the output of production. There may be people betwen A1 and A2, 
hence marginal people, because they are subsidised. Highly 
productive labour produces a surplus beyond its own needs of 
reproduction even with a small amount of labour time. This surplus 
can be used for the subsidisation of an excess of population beyond 
the threshold of marginality. Some have better access to this surplus; 
some are excluded and may therefore rely on the patronage of those 
with access to the surplus.  
Under most plausible conditions, those who enjoy privilege will 
find allies for stabilising hierarchy and inequality among those at the 
bottom of society for economic reasons. The threshold of population 
growth may be crossed because there are many convergi g interests in 
population growth. Parents expect from their children support in their 
old age. Parents do not know how many of children born will survive. 
For those in control of the surplus, clients fed from surplus represent 
power. For the marginals, this surplus represents the right to survive. 
Instead of destroying it periodically in order to appease the invisible 
world, they offer permanent services to those in cotrol of this very 
worldly surplus and their gods (and ancestors). 
The ruler as a ritual leader has to emerge on the basis of an alliance 
between the marginals and those in control of surplus. This is 
illustrated by the transition from communitarian lieage-based modes 
of production -as existed in Oceania or Subsaharan Africa (Goody 
1963: 8; Southall 1988), -to more hierarchical tributary modes of 
production- as seen in Asia with specific forms of transition as 
discussed by Stein11, and the controversy on the extent of power and 
violence in this process of strengthening of hierarchies. The theories 
of Oriental despotism, the Asiatic mode of production renamed 
tributary modes of production, and of the “Ancient Empires” are all 
attempts to assemble highly inegalitarian pre-capitalist structures in 
the most different geographic regions and cultural settings as a single 
type and to distinguish them from the other pre-capitalist structure-
European feudalism (Abrahamian 1975; Berktay 1987: 298). These 
                                                   
11 Kulke 1982: 237; Sharma 1989; Stein 1997: 148. 





non-feudal structures are considered as rather immobile and subject to 
incessant ups and downs in the rise and fall of empires and dynasties, 
even if they may be characterised by differences in their systems of 
incentive for those in control of the surplus (Moseley & Wallerstein 
1978: 266). European feudalism is seen as open to in vation and 
change and allows something new to mature, so that i  breeds 
capitalism within its lap. It is assumed that there is something specific 
in the superstructure of European feudalism which was lacking 
elsewhere, especially in “despotic” Asia.  
This distinction between feudalism and all other pre-capitalist class 
societies, which for convenience I call tributary modes of production 
(as the surplus is appropriated by discretionary political intervention 
by the beneficiaries), is the basis of Orientalist thinking and leads to 
the claim that the West is unique with its relatively decentralised 
political structures: relatively “independent” feudal lords, autonomous 
cities, rational cultural orientations which lead to the “Enlightenment”, 
and also strong property rights, as the bulk of documents through 
which we know about European mediaeval society are related to 
conflicts about property. Here Europe is said to have experienced the 
early development of a significant role for markets and monetary 
relations instead of the dominance of the historical school’s natural 
economy based on estate production for subsistence. 
The critics of Orientalism have shown that India or China were not 
despotic (Abrahamian 1974: 14 ff.; Asad 1973: 2279), that “sub-
kings” were as unruly as feudal lords in Europe (Brara 1994: 227), 
that there were powerful social movements in the form f religious 
movements which claimed, as in Europe, spiritual equality of all 
humans (Omvedt 2003: 215; Nadkarni 2003: 4787). Urbanisation, a 
monetary economy and markets, including long distance trade, were 
as important in the East as in Europe (Heesterman 1989: 10).  
These controversies, as well as the controversy over the comparative 
levels of technical progress (the so-called California debate12) have 
their origin in the absence of a solid politico-economic basis in the 
construction of explanatory models. Capitalism is based on the 
production of commodities by means of investment goods which can 
be owned privately and hence may be accumulated. Therefore, what 
matters is not the centralised or decentralised chara ter of the 
                                                   
12 Pomeranz 2000; Vries 2008; Zurndorfer 2003. 




superstructure, or the openness to societal change, but the orientation 
of final demand. What has to be explained is how profit, in the above 
definition, could become stronger in some parts of Europe in 
comparison with other ways of gaining access to the surplus, i.e. rent. 
The decisive variable is the capacity of a mass of relatively poor 
European consumers to participate in increasing productive capacities, 
not only by removing the hardship of famine, but by increasing the 
consumption of non-agricultural “industrial” goods. 
The California debate gives a first empirical key. It highlights the 
high level of technical skill in the hand production f high quality 
items (Sahai 2005: 529 ff.). These authors have, however, not been 
able to produce evidence of mechanisation or mechani al devices in 
Asia, although mechanical devices such as watermills were known in 
the Himalayas. The debate pays tribute, perhaps unintent onally, to the 
old argument of the three tiered structure of Asian pre-industrial 
“industrial”, i.e. crafts production: in particular, the exceptionally high 
quality of luxury products for the upper strata, and the low levels of 
technical expertise in rural industries and resource-dependent 
industries like mining and salt production (Gadgil 1971: 45; Habib 
1995: 221). It confirms the absence of large incentiv s for improving 
industries oriented to mass-consumption which would compete, not 
for excellence, but for lowering the cost of standardised production of 
average quality products. Despite his praise for Asia’s excellence, 
A. G. Frank (1998: 286), long before the California debate, had to 
admit Europe’s superiority in mass consumption production13.  
Early studies highlighted the orientation of European crafts 
towards the middle and lower income markets14 and the integration of 
European peasants into a market exchange system, as well as their 
consumption of the production from urban, often guild-free, industries. 
These studies also focus on the rise of rural industries against regulated 
and often guild-dominated industries in the established cities, especially 
in the debate on proto-industrialisation (Mager 1988: 302). Within the 
                                                   
13 Bayly (2000: 94) and Norel (2005: 439) observe thatere were tendencies in China 
and India of increasing mass production, but do not compare this to the predomi-
nant orientation to luxuries. This aspect would have to be discussed in the light of 
the comparable observations of mass production of pottery and possibly also tex-
tiles without machinery in the antique structures of Mediterranean Europe. 
14 Rader 1971: 82; Biddick 1985: 831; Dyer 1989: 321; Becker & Gehrisch 1977: 
1377. 





feudal system, the expansion of mass demand became strong enough 
in some regions -also through exports on the basis of the implied 
comparative cost advantage in mass-oriented industries- to trigger off 
large scale investment in the improvement of standardised production, 
frequently through small scale industry in particular regions (Thirsk 
1978: 65; Berg 1993). 
The emergence of this “popular pole” of industry may have been 
facilitated by those specific features which the theory of the 
uniqueness of the West had focused on, but it cannot be used to 
maintain the inevitable character of the concentration of demand on 
standardised industrial products. Many had, however, contributed. 
They may have occurred in different mixtures in different regions, but 
their common feature is the empowerment of labour, as demonstrated 
during the middle ages in North Western Europe by the end of 
serfdom. Other aspects of the superstructure have certainly hindered 
the ability of the powerful to use violence against labour, such as the 
rivalry between the ecclesiastical (i.e. The Pope) and secular hierarchy 
(i.e. The Emperor), as well as between eminent feudal leaders who 
claimed to be independent from central instances as kings who 
represented nations. The intra-elite rivalries may h ve increased the 
possibility of labour expressing certain demands, as did demographic 
catastrophes such as the plague, all of which played th  role of 
midwife to capitalism. In addition, ideologies functioned as religious 
beliefs, for example the notion of ritual equality among all humans as 
present in all monotheistic religions (but, indeed, also in many others). 
But all this probably did not go beyond the argument made by Engels, 
that the elites of Europe were more dependent on their labour than 
elsewhere and as a result they even adopted the local anguage 
understood by their peasants (Engels 1884: 395), which was a much 
less common development elsewhere. But vernacular languages had 
an important role in all religious reform movements, including in 
India (with Buddhism and even the Hindu Bhakti movements, Mair 
1994: 712; Raychoudhary 1999: 278). Beyond cultural factors, other 
factors may have played a role such as the availability of new land in 
regions newly discovered (by Europeans and only for Europeans) and 
opened for colonisation by the peasantries of North Western Europe 
with their access to the central eastern European pl ins (German 
eastern colonisation). This may have been important not only in 
improving the lot of the migrants generally, but also that of the 




remaining population (Kaak 2007: 73; Mottek 1964: 13 ff.). In 
comparison with the Asian empires, the relatively continuous rainfall 
experienced in Europe could be mentioned as a factor which 
influenced peasant independence from infrastructural works of 
irrigation. There may exist many other causes which remain to be 
excavated by research that will not invalidate the fundamental 
argument: the empowerment of labour is a precondition of capitalism. 
The model is therefore open to specified multi-causality.  
Nonetheless, feudal lords were not systematic supporters of 
freedom. The stronger factions participated in king-led alliances in 
order to gain access to the redistribution of spoil made available via 
conquest and centralisation, so that European feudalism was full of 
attempts to centralise and to build up a universal monarchy which 
China had achieved after the warring kingdoms (Mo 1995: 101 f.). 
Universal monarchy was the great ideal of many intellectuals during 
the European Middle Age (Osiander 2007: 322). More so, the Asian 
structures had been the yardstick continuously promoted by 
“rationalising” reformers in the existing European feudal structures, 
with the most prominent examples being the Emperor F ederic II15 in 
his Sicilian domains, the Spanish monarchs of the 16th century (which 
Marx had called an Asiatic despotism, Marx 1854: 440 f.) and French 
absolutism16. The centralisation of the feudal kingdoms through 
hierarchical bureaucracies was ultimately achieved, if only 
temporarily. 
One of the characteristics of highly inegalitarian tributary 
structures has been masterfully analysed in the Islamic world by Ibn 
Khaldûn (1967: 570-9) and in the dynastic cycle literature of China 
(Reischauer & Fairbank 1960: 117; Moore 1966: 457). Centralisation 
of the ruling class -taking its purest form in the establishment of 
bureaucracies- led to harsher exploitation, increasing resistance, and 
the de-legitimation of the authorities. In decline, however, the lack of 
public order and the fact that craft production was not oriented 
towards a mass sector did not necessarily lead to growth, even where 
                                                   
15 Comninel 2000: 22; Lieberman 1997: 500; Abulafia 1988: esp. 44 f. 
16 The approach therefore is not to engage in intellectual gymnastics in order to de-
termine the capitalist or non-capitalist character of absolutism, as the tendency of 
the lords to centralize rents, and the tendency of capitalists to gain access to rents 
in order to be safe from excessive competition, simply converge. See as examples 
of this debate: Anderson 1974: 34–40, Wallerstein 1974. 350f. 





the exploitation of the peasantry may have decreased. The reduction of 
the tributary state’s regulatory capacity does not ecessarily lead to 
thriving mass consumption goods industries. 
I conclude, therefore, that the emergence of capitalism is the result 
of accidents in the wake of which labour became empowered to an 
extent, in space and time, through which a popular pole of industry 
could emerge. The rise of new elites, hence the bourge isie, was not 
the result of an original fragmentation of the European elites 
supported by socio-culturally determined ideas about the limits of 
centralised power, but of the emergence of possibilities to thrive on 
the basis of profit without being patronised by the central power. 
There is no mechanism through which the ruling strata, be they 
fragmented or centralised, can develop on the basis of their own 
economic interests an interest in rising mass demand and hence create 
the dynamically expanding market for standardised products as the 
basis on which to build profit. 
4- CAPITALISM EMERGED BECAUSE OF RESISTANCE FROM 
BELOW AND POLITICAL AND SOCIAL CONDITIONS 
FAVOURABLE FOR SUBALTERN LABOUR IN VARIOUS FORMS 
There were a variety of factors in some parts of Europe which 
contributed to the empowerment of labour against ren , and this did 
not per se lead to an outcome of “transition” to capitalism. Marxian, 
as well as modernisation as well as classical economic theory, 
maintains that capitalism requires extraordinary and continuously 
increasing surpluses for investment. Marx's theory f primary 
accumulation is based on the idea of rendering labour weak by 
expropriating it. Labour has to be separated from its means of 
production in order to make it docile and pliable to new methods of 
production and cheaper wages. Monetary Keynesianism contributes to 
this idea as it focuses on monetary policies in order to trigger off 
investment but neglects an analysis of power relations which are 
favourable to labour. My own interpretation of the Industrial 
Revolution is opposed to these positions. There are four empirical 
issues, which can be used to check the plausibility of the contending 
interpretations: (1) the development of real wages b fore and during 
the Industrial Revolution, (2) the timing, the extent of, and the 
regional focus of the enclosure movement in Britain, (3) the product 




mix of industry which emerged in the Industrial Revolution, and (4) 
the role of impoverishment following an interpretation of the 
macroeconomic effects of the English Poor Laws.  
Concerning the first point the discussion surrounding real wages 
around the period of the Industrial Revolution actully seems to be 
characterised by agreement on the relatively high, and rising wages of 
English labour in sterling silver terms. Broadberry and Gupta (2006) 
report relatively high and rising real wages in terms of non-food 
products, despite less pronounced increases in grain w ges. Also, 
however, the level of food production and consumption developed 
favourably over time despite the temporary decline during the 18th 
century from previously higher levels17. This coincides with the 
absence of famines in North Western Europe from the lat  17th 
century (Clark 1976: 379; Habakkuk 1952). The argument of the 
biometric school about a decline of body height from higher levels in 
the late 18th century is relativised by its own studies. This decline took 
place in (urban) settings with relatively high wages, so that it is due 
less to the availability of basic wage goods such as food, than to the 
preference for non-essentials, so-called amenities, by newly mobile 
people (Komlos 2003; Cinnirella 2008: 341). The centr s of the 
Industrial Revolution attracted immigrants and maintained small and 
medium farms in agriculture (Redford 1964: 62; Lyle 2007: 100). 
Vries’s observation of comparatively high wages in North Western 
Europe in relation to the rest of the world, even after the crisis of the 
17th century, confirms this view (Vries 2009: 189).  
Comparisons between China and North Western Europe that 
established similar levels of day wages were shown to eglect the 
much higher number of working days for north-west European rural 
labour (Huang 2002: 534). Statistical information about declining 
consumption from the decades between the 18th and 19th centuries do 
not contradict the basic argument: low private mass consumption was 
due to the war effort (French wars) and does not indicate low mass 
demand but rather decline in consumption goods production. 
Against the extended literature which claims that standards of 
living in Europe declined between the late 15th and early 18th 
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MacKeown, Brown & Record 1972: 352–60. Also acknowledged by critics: Kom-
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centuries, I would argue that in the wake of demographic growth since 
the 15th century the declining availability of food per capit  lead to 
quantitatively less food consumption, or to consumption of more 
expensive food, so that the observation of high non-fo d item 
consumption by Broadberry and Gupta (2006) further confirms my 
argument. 
Second, Marx18 following Thomas Moore (the 16th century 
author), focussed on the proletarianisation of English labour through 
the enclosure of the common fields, which in the 18th century deprived 
labour of its means of subsistence, particularly the lower strata of 
rural labour (Marx 1867: 746). Land concentration diminished until 
the Glorious Revolution19, so that this shedding of labour occurred in 
a period of growing industrial employment when money wages also 
increased. Enclosure favoured large landlords mostly outside the 
regions of the Industrial Revolution, while in the c ntral regions of the 
Industrial Revolution enclosure was often achieved by compromise20. 
Land concentration in the 18th century resulted in the gentry selling 
large segments of land it had acquired during the preceding period of 
concentration in land ownership (Wallerstein 1974: 125, 240). These 
sales were realised on the basis of high prices which allowed the 
gentry, a new privileged class with special habits, to finance its shift 
from agriculture to developing decentralised industrie  and trade 
(Clark 1998; Holderness 1971: 174). 
Third, agricultural innovation or the so-called agricultural 
revolution, was not the result of highly mechanised production or the 
shift in land usage from food production to export production (e.g. the 
wool industry-“the sheep eating the men”) but was to a large extent 
the result of the ingenuity and economic freedom of the English 
yeomanry21. Overall, agricultural employment increased until the corn 
laws of the middle 19th-century. The shedding of rural labour was less 
than the demographic increase during the 18th and early 19th 
                                                   
18 As well as many others writers after Marx. 
19 Cooper 1967: 435; Habakkuk 1939: 2–5; Hilton 1967: 336; Hoskins 1950: 154, 
178. 
20 Chambers 1946; Allen 2003: 430; Allen 1988: 120 ff.; Marxists admit the argu-
ment: Kulischer 1965: 64. 
21 Allen 1992: esp. 310; Tribe 1981: 85. This opposes the Brenner theory: Brenner 
1976; Brenner 2001. 




centuries22, and agricultural modernisation provided food for the 
masses as well as additional employment, not only in agriculture, but 
in growing small scale industrial undertakings which proliferated 
particularly in the core regions of the Industrial Revolution (Thirsk 
1978: 159; Berg 1993). 
This orientation of agricultural growth to mass needs was the basis 
of English agricultural superiority until the middle of the 19th century: 
England had the highest growth of agricultural production and 
agricultural productivity (1500-1739 production doubled, Allen 1989: 
224) and already in 1800 one farmer was producing output for more 
than 14 non-agricultural people (Bairoch 1966:28). The relation 
between seed planted and crop yields doubled after the late Middle 
Ages, and agricultural output per land area also doubled23. Clark 
(2007: 98) even observed an increase in marginal productivity of farm 
labour. At the same time, extensive and decentralised land 
improvement measures were realised and the use of artifici l (partly 
chemical) fertilisation began24. A similar process occurred in industry 
with the mechanised production of the largest single item of non-food 
expenditure in poor households: textiles (John 1965: 22). In addition, 
many improvements were realised in other areas of industrial mass 
production. Even the hitherto luxury items of Asian origin were 
adapted to cheaper production methods so that their consumption was 
made more accessible and thus enlarged (Berg 2002: 3). There is a 
debate, reflected in these observations, on whether the enlargement of 
consumption was due mainly to the rise of a continuously growing 
urban middle class or whether the “wretched masses” really shared in 
the progress of technology (Eversley 1967: 210). English literature is 
full of critical accounts of increasing poverty in the country, therefore 
a politico-economic analysis of the central aspects of official poverty 
management should provide some insights here. 
The English poor laws, which came into effect during the 
transitional period to capitalism -the so-called early bourgeois period 
of the late 16th and early 17th centuries25- are not the proof of reckless 
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2006. 
24 Brunt 2004: 193; Kerridge 1967: 243; Wrigley 2006: 438 
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exploitation that Marx would have us believe (Marx 1867: 703), but 
rather a powerful instrument for the protection of the poor against 
their marginalisation (Elsenhans 1980; 1992). Let us return to our 
above figure on the marginality-cum-rent model: We can consider the 
English poor as people who were unable to produce a surplus beyond 
their basic needs for subsistence. With the introduction of market 
relations and the workers’ separation from the means of production 
(i.e. land) they were displaced and effectively became vagrants. The 
parishes could force them to work for salaries below the cost of their 
subsistence and then complement the difference by putting them into 
poor houses where they received basic food and shelter, a beit of the 
most rudimentary kind. In comparison with many of today's marginalised 
masses in poor countries of the South, Oliver Twist as better off. In 
opposition to Marx’s explanation, the privileged, rentiers or incipient 
capitalists, had to pay for the total subsistence of the poor, partly in 
the form of a wage in line with work provided, and partly as a tax on 
their assets (in the English case, on land). Only o the basis of this tax 
could the parishes pay for the upkeep of the poor in the poor houses. 
Poor relief consisted in the channelling of parts of the surplus into the 
upkeep of impoverished masses which articulated a demand for food 
and machine-produced consumption goods so that responsive 
capitalists could increase investment spending. At the same time, total 
surplus obviously decreased (Malthus 1958: 57 f.). Mass consumption 
rose and even profit even increased tendentially. Only the rents 
accruing to the privileged decreased. During the whole of the 17th and 
18th centuries the English gentleman represented merely a second rate 
member of the upper strata of European society in relation to the 
continental aristocrats (Thomas 1963: 59; Borkenau 1934: 172). 
Out of these four empirical insights we can draw the conclusion 
that the decisive element which allows the empowerment of labour is 
the removal of marginality. The removal of marginalty by increasing 
the marginal product of labour and/or by social measures which 
protect the poor is the basis of the emergence of aproletariat, the 
doubly free worker who is liberated from all pre-capit list ties but also 
from any property, i.e. the means of production (Marx 1867: 742), and 
who, according to Marx, had only to cast off his fetters (Marx & 
Engels 1845/46: 69 f.). In contrast to wage workers in pre-capitalist 
economies (where the wage relation already existed), such proletarians 
in incipient capitalist modes of production did not exchange their 




freedom for new kinds of patronage because they had no need of 
protection from above and could stand as individuals on the labour 
market without the protection of a patron for one simple reason: they 
produced a surplus, therefore they could be exploited, and hence, they 
had a fair chance of being employed. Exploitation is a more 
complicated relation than has been described by those who merely 
criticise it from a moral standpoint. 
The varieties of ways in which this empowerment was achieved 
also explains that there is no uniform pattern of transition to 
capitalism, but that there are various possibilities of empowering 
labour. In the western regions of Germany there was a mixture 
between agrarian structures of the English type and massive 
infrastructural spending on railways (Fremdling 1977; Kocka 1990: 
68). Pre-capitalist ruling classes in Japan pursued the goal of 
increasing military power and fiscal revenue. They appeared as a pre-
capitalist elite which was committed to modernisation because they 
hoped to increase resources available for investment by shifting from 
taxes payable in kind to a future where land taxes could be payable in 
monetary form. It was only unwise state-led investment spending 
which led to inflationary pressures that became the real burden on the 
peasantries. Rural markets expanded because the peasants could 
increase their marketable surplus (Hayami 1972: 29; Grabowski 1994: 
443). The adoption of the Western values of the bourgeois revolution 
was, however, not among the priorities of most “refo mers” as was the 
case in many other countries that wanted to improve their military 
potential against an intruding West. 
Whatever the size of the Westward migration in the United States 
and comparable possibilities of colonisation, in other regions of new 
settlement (I make reference here to the famous controversies on the 
Turner thesis) labour could not become marginal when t re was the 
possibility of withdrawing to a homestead with a resonable level of 
production, even if only a few members of society took this option 
(Webb 1952: 27 ff.; Coelho 1976: 221; Karabel 1979: 2212 ff.). 
Outward migration also empowered non-migratory populations. Such 
outward migration in the form of the transatlantic migration of the 
19th century played an important role in reducing marginality, 
especially in the Scandinavian countries (O’Rourke & Williamson 
1995: 174; Riegler 1978: 45). 
Increasing exports also played a supporting role, fr example, in Japan 





as well as in some European economies-which where clos to the centres of 
self-sustained industrialisation (Ranis 1957: 602; Mokyr 1974: 381). 
It is possible to identify in a uniform manner the successful 
management of marginality, or absence thereof, in the economies 
which achieved the transition to capitalism. The decisive factor, 
empowerment of labour, was in the final instance thcondition 
through which the neoclassical theory of wage drift functioned. What 
all this evidence shows is that rising mass incomes ar  a consequence 
of capitalist growth and not a root cause of it. 
5- CAPITALISM IS EXPANSIVE BUT NOT CONTAGIOUS 
Capitalism depends on the empowerment of labour, but it does not 
lead by necessity to such empowerment if transferred f om outside by 
the mechanisms of integration into the international division of labour. 
Authors such as Marx and those from the classical and neoclassical 
schools assume that the search for cheap labour leads to the 
propagation of capitalism as the latter is based on the possibility of 
appropriating as much surplus labour as possible. Th  Keynesian view 
followed in this paper assumes that integration into the capitalist 
world system under the impulse of the search for prfit by capitalists 
may not lead to the emergence of social structures which allow 
capitalist accumulation in the newly penetrated regions. Therefore the 
penetration of non-capitalist structures by capitalist ones may result in 
under-development instead of development. Transnatio l trade 
relations and even international specialisation exist d long before the 
emergence of capitalism, and capitalism may take over such relations, 
and even decisively influence all of the participants. However, this 
still does not imply that the capitalist world system under the 
dominance of capitalist centres transforms the whole world into a 
capitalist structure. 
Trade, even pre-capitalist trade, ultimately depends on comparative 
cost advantages which are transformed into cost competitiveness by 
the adjustment of basic reference goods under capitalist conditions, 
the general price levels (specie currencies), or the exchange rate. Pre-
capitalist long-distance trade was regulated by the desire to exchange 
valuable luxury products from the economy of origin against the 
maximum possible amount of luxury products in the dstination 




economy and which could be sold at high prices at home26. Prices 
depended on the uniqueness of the product so that the quantities 
traded of any single item were limited. The richer a society, the more 
diverse luxury items it can offer so that the overall profit in trade 
increased. Long-distance trade, therefore, primarily connected 
Wittfogel’s rich hydraulic empires (Wittfogel 1932: 594-597). Trading 
routes also had to be protected against free riders. All of this favoured 
the more powerful states and Empires.  
The aim of European trade expansion in the 16th century was to 
enter the existing networks of global trade under the best possible 
conditions. It consisted in circumventing major powers who had 
control of the existing trading routes and led, therefore, to new 
discoveries. This process was largely characterised by power and 
plunder, similar to the process of “previous accumulation” which had 
occurred in Europe and elsewhere earlier (the latter of n referred to as 
exploitation). The poverty of Europe in luxury goods created great 
incentive to exert power, to search for precious metals, and to proceed 
to import substitution in areas under European control wherever 
possible-e.g. the plantation economy of the Caribbean and some other 
parts of America, but also import-substituting industrialisation in 
textiles and luxury items (Berg 2002: 3).  
If the argument holds that any particular capitalis technology 
reduces the costs of production so that it becomes self-financing, then 
such exploitation was not necessary for accumulation. If the argument 
holds that technical progress is achieved under capitalism through 
economies of scale (mass production) then the plunder described here 
constituted more of a threat to accumulation than support of it, as it 
allowed for greater inequality, the enrichment of old elites, and the 
political disempowerment of labour27. The pattern of plunder and 
monopoly control of trading routes for rare products like spices did 
not constitute any departure from pre-capitalist structures because it 
                                                   
26 This does not exclude the fact that outside Europe there was also an increase in 
mass consumption-oriented trade (Lewis 1973. 256). The importance of Asian 
cloth for English trade and the East India Companies is further proof. As I do not 
consider trade and exports as an important cause of the transition to capitalism, the 
issue need not be pursued here. 
27 Wallerstein 1974: 22-24, underlines the importance of peasant resistance and rising 
incomes in the 15th and 16th centuries, but on page 118, characterises a role of the 
periphery for accumulation. 





discouraged capitalist technical development whereas external 
financial resources where not required for investment28. European 
trade expansion led to increased interaction and also to patterns of 
specialisation which led to trade in items other then just luxuries. 
These relations, whether elaborate or loosely connected, may be called 
a world system when the emerging pattern of specialisations lead to 
path dependent patterns of differential development opportunities as 
described in the image of interconnected development and under-
development29. 
The emerging pattern of global pre-industrial specialisation was 
hence characterised by: a comparative advantage in luxury items in 
the Asian civilisations, together with naturally occurring goods such 
as spices; and marginalisation of the communitarian modes of 
production which were used to acquire labour at prices below Europe's 
cost of reproduction (slave trade). The European economies without 
access to wealth, but capable of defending themselve  against 
dispossession or enslavement, had to produce simple low quality 
products which were characteristic of European exports until the 20th 
century. 
As productivity increases in the wake of technical nnovation were 
higher in branches where stocks of raw materials were less important, 
the result was that economies which were technically backward soon 
emerged with a comparative advantage in raw material production. In 
addition they suffered less than the dynamically industrialising 
economies from deterioration of natural conditions, the exhaustion of 
mining deposits, etc., conditions on which raw materi l production 
depended. They became price competitive where the limit d bulk allowed 
profitable transportation, for example this began with non-ferrous 
metals rather than iron. 
Technical growth through mass consumption implies process 
innovation which leads to product innovation. New production 
processes which developed on the basis of the producti n of mass 
consumption products made possible the production of new goods to 
meet needs which until then could not be satisfied, or goods, the 
existence of which had remained hitherto in the realm of fantasy, such 
as the flying carpet of the fairy tales. These new products were 
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29 Frank & Gills 1993: 38; Wallerstein 1988: 582. 




initially expensive and inaccessible but were to become democratised. 
This increase in the availability of new luxury items on the basis of 
mass consumption-oriented technical innovation caused the loss of 
markets for the Asian producers of old luxuries, not only in Europe, 
but also in their own countries.  
The capitalist world system was characterised, on the one side, by 
the co-existence of capitalist economies based on rising mass 
consumption, permanent technical innovation, and the development of 
new products; and, on the other side, by economies without such mass 
consumption. Here the privileged tried to increase th ir purchasing 
power by reducing the cost of production usually by shedding 
marginal labour, which had until then been protected under pre-
capitalist relations of solidarity which, admittedly, took very different 
forms. This had important consequences for economies that had not 
yet developed. Their external position as exporters wa  characterised 
by specialisation in price-inelastic products, which implied 
tendentially declining terms of trade (even if terms of trade rose in 
some periods when products from these “peripheries” initially entered 
European mass consumption-especially in the late 19h century such 
as coffee), an interest in keeping prices high through the administrative 
control of available quantities (i.e. raw material c rtels), and the explanation 
of technical backwardness as a result of exploitatin hrough forgone 
earnings in traditional raw material exports. This allowed the denunciation 
of Western imperialist domination. However, at the same time the powerful 
classes in the non-western periphery attempted to ally with the 
imperialists and become their bridgeheads. High earnings from 
exports created the illusion that maintaining social st bility could be 
achieved without special effort in support of the down-trodden. These 
bridgeheads easily accepted the marginality which followed from the 
dissolution of pre-capitalist embeddedness of the poor in the villages, 
but also in the cities, to which the marginals were attracted in order to 
enjoy some minimal benefit from the trickle down of rents in the 
hands of the urban “elites”. Limited modernisation such as extended 
healthcare systems as well as some of the benefits of colonial 
domination (such as the end of internecine warfare) contributed to 
demographic growth and intensified marginality. As such, a 
disempowered population could not impose mass production for its 
own needs which would have created employment for the 
marginalised and hence ultimately helped the transitio  to capitalist 






Under-development appeared simultaneously in the form f the 
scarcity of investment capital -especially lack of f reign exchange-, 
and social crisis characterised by surplus population. The employment 
problem could be tackled either through exports of new products or 
better raw material prices. More exports of new products required 
devaluation until comparative advantage in price-elastic manufactured 
products was transformed into cost competitiveness. Without an 
accompanying corrective intervention in the raw materi l sector this 
meant the disappearance of good earnings from traditional exports, 
especially raw materials. Good raw material prices were, however, 
looked upon by the great majority of the population as the wealth of 
the country. An alternative solution was the increase of wealth via 
politically imposed higher prices. The appropriation f this wealth 
constituted the collection of a rent.  
The channelling of that rent into previously unprofitable investments 
-as the basic aspect of economic diversification under conditions of 
under-development- required a structure which did not follow the rule 
of profit maximisation, and this could only be a non-capitalist political 
structure. The appropriation and channelling of rents to overcome 
under-development implied an increase in the economic importance of 
the state, the representativeness of this state vis-a- i  the target 
population (this had implications for later decolonisation), and the 
constitution of a political class in control of the state. Such a class was 
independent from domination by other classes for the simple reason 
that it had direct access to rent and could use rent on the basis of its 
own discretionary power, free of control by other classes (including 
the “metropolitan bourgeoisie”). It was this independ nce which 
separated this class from the idea of Weberian bureauc acy. I call it a 
state class (Elsenhans 1981: 59 ff.; Elsenhans 1996: 109 ff.).  
These state classes constituted both a danger and promise. The 
danger consisted in the waste of rents, especially if they fuelled the 
accumulation of increasingly heavy-handed rentier state structures 
which further blocked social development. The promise consisted in 
their capacity to build up diversified economic struc ures through 
which previously unprofitable investments could be realised and 
become profitable. Such profitability could come from the 
development of the web of inter-industrial relations, but also through 
employment creation and welfare measures which lead to growth in 




internal mass demand. Both of these facilitated greate  industrial 
production through learning by doing and skill formation, and 
ultimately improving comparative advantage and international 
competitiveness as described by all those analyses which insist on 
import-substitution as a precondition or a support f  the shift to 
export-orientation. 
The notion of a state or administrative bourgeoisie removes all the 
distinctions between societies with politically based exploitation and 
capitalism. It hollows out the very concept of capit lism in order to 
construct a moral indignation. The argument that these state classes 
can achieve only the transition to capitalism and not to socialism 
(Mattick 1969: 341) can be qualified in the sense that even this 
depends on their capacity to achieve high levels of employment or the 
empowerment of labour in ways other than employment. In this, some 
state classes have been more successful than others, independent of 
whether they have been oriented historically toward rightist ideologies 
(South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand) or leftist ideologies (People's 
Republic of China, Vietnam). There were cases where a socialist 
discourse was remarkably unsuccessful (Algeria, Egypt). 
The fact that these goals were achieved on the basis of improving 
financial resources appropriated as rents indicates that higher income 
for non-capitalist agents did not and does not harm the growth of the 
capitalist centre. 
This invalidates the enduring argument by the North in its 
negotiations with the South, at least since the foundation of UNCTAD 
until the latter's failure in the mid-80s. Here it was argued along 
neoclassical lines that a reduction of resources for the North would 
limit growth there and consequently the capacity of the North to carry 
the South. Instead, the higher purchasing power of the South provided 
markets for the North particularly where rents went to state classes in 
highly populated countries. 
The failure of the so-called Third World development state 
indicates that the hope of establishing capitalism is not fulfilled by the 
availability of enormous financial resources. Capitlism created rent-
based structures which for long periods were not dissolved either by 
capitalist forces from outside or by internal contradictions in these 
societies. They were dissolved by the overconsumption of the ruling 
state classes, just as described in the parallel structures of ancient Arab 
empires in the work of Ibn Khaldûn (1967: 571). 





6- THE GLOBALISATION OF RENT: THE ACTUAL 
GLOBALISATION PROCESS UNDERMINES THE SOCIAL AND 
ECONOMIC CONDITIONS FOR CAPITALISM AND CREATES 
THE THREAT OF A RETURN TO RENT-BASED STRUCTURES 
Manufactured exports as the centrepiece of globalisation may lead 
to generalised rent seeking at the global level, even if we do not take 
into account the increasing market imperfections created through 
technical monopolies and company networking aimed at the reduction 
of transaction costs (such as hierarchical chains of pr duction, 
Elsenhans 2006). Globalisation is not based on a generalisation of 
perfect competition but on intelligent mechanisms of using rents for 
improving international competitiveness. It may lead to the 
empowerment of labour, but given its limited character, this is not 
probable, and less so because of the strategies that leading and 
developing economies pursue as their second options.  
Export-oriented industrialisation is often accompanied by low real 
wages, but is primarily successful via relatively low international 
labour costs30. Low real wages measure the basket of goods available 
for wage earners, while low international labour costs measure the 
cost of labour internationally via a freely convertible currency. A 
simple search shows that per capita incomes at purchasing parity -and 
hence also real wages- in most Asian and Latin American countries 
are about four or five times higher than per capita incomes -and hence 
also monetary wages- in international currency at the going exchange 
rate. The low labour cost areas are not the poverty and hunger ridden 
regions of sub-Saharan Africa, but East and South East Asia where 
famines have been overcome since 1945. 
Exchange rates lower than purchasing parity are based on the 
mobilisation of rent from the agricultural sector. At low levels of 
income, the subsistence needs of the additional workers employed in 
the enlarged export sector consists predominantly of food (about 50%) 
as well as equal shares (of about 10%) of textiles, shelter, traditional 
household equipment, and modern appliances like TV, refrigerators, 
etc. With the exception of the appliances, these products are all within 
reach of the local informal sector and small scale industry, at least in 
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Asia, North Africa, and Latin America. Most of the appliances are 
produced in countries of the South, at least in standard quality 
versions. In order to feed these additional workers oriented towards 
exports as well as workers in the industries which supply them, 
therefore depends on the availability of additional food, i.e. on 
agricultural surplus. Therefore, the successful export-oriented 
countries have all benefited from the Green Revolution, especially in 
rice production (East and South East Asia) and theyhave been self-
sufficient, at least initially, in food production. This is a major 
difference compared with the bulk of sub-Saharan Africa and the Arab 
world. 
After devaluation the newly available surplus could be bought by 
newly employed workers with the incomes paid to them in national 
currency. These incomes gave them an entitlement to wage goods, in 
this case, basically food. Through this mechanism, the ground rent of 
the landowners was channelled into mass consumption w thout any 
further administrative mechanism, such as a land tax. Without this 
devaluation land owners would have been able either to xchange the 
produce of the land on the world market, possibly at a better exchange 
rate, or, in case of an absence of this external demand, use the 
additional food to employ additional workers on their estates in non-
agricultural occupations in order to transform the ground rent into 
non-agricultural products for their own consumption. Where both 
possibilities were excluded, the ground rent would probably not have 
been produced at all, or not been appropriated by the landowners, but 
rather transferred to (foreign) consumers in the form f cheap food on 
the world market. The rent character of the additional agricultural 
output is evident in the case of the successful Green Revolution, 
however, it also becomes visible in other situations such as in 
Vietnam, where many regulations were imposed on agricultural 
producers in order to block the export of food. Traditional agricultural 
exports are, in most cases, extremely “profitable” at devalued rates of 
exchange.  
Export-oriented industrialisation in developing economies in the 
South is less an expression of a generalised capitalism but of the 
emergence of rent which can be used for subsidising industrial 
diversification-in this case not by means of protecting the home 
market as in the previous model of import-substituting 
industrialisation, but by means of using the world market. 





Devaluation-driven exports are therefore limited by the availability 
of an agricultural surplus. The removal of the capacity for agricultural 
surplus would imply the danger of a return to famines which are 
desirable for no class whatsoever. The other limit for devaluation-
driven exports is full employment. Germany after 1949, and later on 
Japan, South Korea and Taiwan, have demonstrated that devaluation-
driven exports lead to an overheating of the economy when high 
levels of employment are achieved. Devaluation-driven exports will 
lead to imported inflation when labour markets become tight. Korean 
economists define as a turning point the level of employment where 
wages increase not only in the export sector but in other sectors as 
well (Bai 1982). Counteracting the international race to the bottom 
with respect to costs and wages will be successful only if all 
participating economies, like the capitalist industrialised economies of 
the late 19th century, operate at high levels of employment. The 
current strategy of “tightening the belt” proposed by mainstream 
policy makers in the high wage economies will not be successful, as 
any effort at cost reduction will be counteracted by further 
devaluations. 
Most of the arguments proposed today to explain that labour can 
no longer act nationally have already been expounded in other 
historical contexts. Bismarck, for example, argued that labour 
protection in Germany would be possible only if Germany could erect 
a Chinese wall against the world market (Huberman & Meissner 2010: 
esp. 665 f.). At that time, the combined pressure of labour in the 
industrially competitive economies caused European governments to 
link trade liberalisation (via bilateral trade agreements) to the 
implementation of labour standards. This step was achieved during a 
period when transnational mass communication among industrialised 
countries was far less developed than is the case today between old 
industrial and emerging industrial countries. It is therefore not the 
absence of communication but the absence of an explanation of the 
structure of the capitalist world system which keeps the organisations 
of labour, marginalised groups in the South, and organised labour in 
the North, from developing the basis for parallel and convergent 
strategies. In the absence of such an understanding both types of 
economies will intensify rent based strategies. 
In industrialised capitalist countries the useless strategy of general 
cuts in labour costs in order to defend oneself against devaluation-




based competition does not prevent large segments of public opinion 
from successfully accepting and even supporting wage increases 
clearly below productivity increases. Social democrati  reformers 
pretend to follow more intelligent strategies by “educating” labour and 
improving “training” in order to acquire a technical dvantage, 
ultimately attempting to secure technical monopolies. This also raises 
the rate of physical productivity growth above the level of real wage 
increases. In both cases, productivity outruns production. When 
productivity increases more rapidly than production the result is the 
classical definition of an under-consumptionist tend cy in Keynesian 
terms (Woytinsky 1935: 165; Bell 1940: 169), whereas neoliberals 
would explain productivity outrunning production asn opportunity 
for accelerating accumulation. The observation of crisis and 
unemployment on the basis of productivity outrunning production is 
therefore a clear indication of the lack of any empirical reality in the 
neoliberal interpretation of crisis. Limiting wage increases and 
increasing the productivity of labour beyond wage increases as a 
reaction to globalisation only leads to under-consumptionist 
tendencies. 
Developing economies follow similar strategies. Devaluation is 
costly, although the costs can be limited if new branches of production 
become rapidly competitive. If existing structures of production with 
export potential can be shown to trigger demand for future branches 
which can already be quickly established with little additional cost for 
training or subsidies, then the promotion of such branches by 
subsidies can be justified with a view to future demand from the 
growing export branches they are linked to. This allows upgrading of 
the export mix and import substitution for inputs and even equipment 
for export branches. For example, when Korea faced declining price 
elasticity of demand for its textile exports, it blocked the import of 
textile machinery (Haggard 1983: 283; Mytelka 1986: 258). Textile 
exporters had to turn to the suppliers of their spare parts, instruct them 
on the characteristics of the machines they needed, an  order from 
them newly designed or imitated textile machinery. Imposing local 
content rules on foreign firms which produce for export is a general 
procedure in developing economies. These rules can be imposed if in 
the developing economy some production lines are so fficient that 





their profit rates are far above average rates31. Burdening them with 
additional costs as did the Koreans by forcing their textile exporters to 
buy initially more costly locally produced textile machinery meant the 
appropriation of an “extra profit” in order to use it for subsidising 
local textile machinery production. The overall mechanism is no 
different from an oil producing country’s tax imposed on oil exports, 
using the proceeds for state-subsidised industrialisation programs. It is 
no accident that East Asian economists discuss the role of rent as a 
subsidy for promoting export orientation32. 
Rent-based strategies of promoting international competitiveness 
by changing comparative advantage are very interesting if the usual 
assumptions inherent in theories about the product cycle, or 
dependencia approaches to the stability of the hierarchy in the 
international division of labour, have proven not t be universally 
applicable (Elsenhans 2004b: 268; Elsenhans 2011). Existing 
developed countries will have a comparative advantage in established 
high technology industries due to knowledge gained from experience 
in specific branches, at least to a certain extent. In emerging high-
technology industries all competing industrial countries, both old and 
emerging, have no experience or accumulated knowledge in the field. 
Emerging countries can overtake the old industrial countries in new 
emerging industries despite lagging behind them in these most modern 
technological areas; as long as this lag is less than e degree to which 
they lag in those industries in which the established industrial 
countries have a leadership position. An example is Korea: Germany 
forgoes its production in microelectronics because it has a huge 
advantage in the production of luxury cars such as Mercedes. The 
success in this latter industry leads to an exchange rate for Germany 
which is so high that its microelectronics production become too 
expensive in relation to, for example, Korea. Such industrial policies 
ultimately depend on the political appropriation of resources to be 
allocated to as yet (or possibly, never) profitable activities, where 
others have to take the risk instead of capitalist entrepreneurs. All 
states strive to be the first by subsidising high-technology (Krugman 
1987: 134 f.). As a result of the implied political struggles also in the 
internal relations between economy and politics the weight of politics 
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increases, even if this is advantageous to capitalist interests (which are 
always particularistic).  
The structure of the WTO and even its conflicts reflects this 
tendency towards the politicisation of the world economy: decisions 
are not mandatory but allow claimants retaliatory measures which 
depend on their political and economic power. The weighting of votes 
is not required when decisions are not mandatory. In particular, 
developing countries do not allow an intensification of liberalisation -
called deep integration- which would deprive governme ts of major 
political tools to promote technology (Young & Peterson 2006: 795). 
It is clear that an alternative strategy would require the politically 
conscious cooperation of all social groups concerned, especially 
labour. I do not intend to discuss the problems which such worldwide 
alliance building would face, but I insist on the fact that this 
requirement documents a major aspect of mature capitalism in 
comparison to emerging capitalism. My model was designed in a way 
that all the participants in the class struggle were mpowering each 
other by simply following their own individual (selfish) interests. 
Initially, ideology may have mattered for mobilising one’s own 
support group. However, ideology was not, until now, necessary for 
understanding the whole system or even the relevanc of one's own 
actions for the stability of the system. Capital could follow the idea 
about rising wages being an impediment to growth because they rose 
anyway as long as labour was struggling to secure resources for 
survival. As such, ideological hegemony was of secondary 
importance. All this may change, however, if capitalism cannot be 
brought operate at levels of consumption appropriate to its productive 
capacity through the simple spontaneous resistance of the needy, but 
nonetheless empowered, masses. 
7- IN CONCLUSION: SOCIALISM OR BARBARISM 
Globalisation is not the only mechanism which threatens the class 
balance which I consider to be characteristic and constitutive of 
capitalism. There are others, such as the emergence of non-material 
needs accompanied by strategies for limiting consumption through 
savings, the need for collective consumption, the div rsification of the 
working class, and, as a result of these developments, the overarching 
importance of the ideological realm. 





My model is based on the following assumptions: households 
without access to means of production willingly accept their exclusion 
from direct participation in the management of surplus and are 
satisfied with being able to meet their immediate neds of 
consumption. They accept the objective socialisation of investment 
through the orientation of final demand. They do not object to the 
privilege assumed by the entrepreneurial class to interpret the future 
development of demand. They “understand” that capitalism operates 
on the illusion of the private character of property, whereas in reality 
most property is simply a mechanism which gives a ticke  to the 
appropriation of surplus value. It was argued that such appropriation 
of surplus labour through “self-valorising capital” depends on high 
levels of employment and rising mass demand.  
This pattern of behaviour can develop only if households have an 
ultimate guarantee in imposing their condition of empowerment: 
employment. Capitalism was, and is, successful as long as all 
participants are confident in their own future empowerment. There is 
no need for a cultural, political or social mechanism to create trust 
beyond either side’s sticking to the formal rules of the game, as long 
as the restrictions of any alternative options, either for households or 
entrepreneurs, do not allow them to seek anything other than 
maximum consumption and maximum profits. In that sense, 
capitalism does not need culture or trust. It can free culture from the 
need of maintaining trust in the system as did the temples and the 
palaces of older times33. 
The argument that savings do not constitute a threat to profits has 
often been rejected by insisting on the cyclical nature of saving and 
dis-saving during the life cycles of households. In major industrialised 
countries, especially Japan and Western Europe, there as been a 
massive rise in rates of saving since the 1960s and 1970s. It has fallen 
only recently, following the downturn of these economies in the 
1990s, although it still remains high in comparison t  the periods 
before 1960 (Harvey 2004, Masubuchi 2006). With respect to the 
possibility of private entrepreneurs raising the rate of accumulation, 
hence increasing their indebtedness, the German data would indicate 
that the creation cost of new productive capacity is not rising. As a 
                                                   
33 As Marx described, these monuments represented the overarching unity of the sys-
tem, Marx 1857-1858: 377. 




consequence of low capital requirements, investment in plant and 
equipment is increasingly financed from amortisation.34 Accelerating 
accumulation by raising external finance of investment appears to 
entrepreneurs as risky and is avoided wherever possible. 
The increase in household savings removes the link between labour 
costs charged to entrepreneurs and demand accruing to enterprises 
constituting an objective demand for redistribution f the right to 
control assets. They occur because labour no longer has just its 
material need of immediate consumption, but additional needs which 
are formulated in a longer-term perspective. Increasing savings 
demonstrate the achievement of capitalism to satisfy increasingly 
material needs, so that non-materialistic needs can be regarded as 
realistic options. Not all of these needs constitute a restriction on 
consumption, however. In relation to existing needs, they are often 
directed to collective goods. Their production requires the collective 
organisation of the potential beneficiaries and this type of collective 
organisation exceeds the organisational and cultural requirements of 
the wage earners organised for collective bargaining. Specific 
collective goods are not easily quantifiable with respect to the benefit 
of all those who are interested in them (including their precise 
qualities), but demand widespread agreement on the precise definition 
of the demands. One of these collective goods is the environment. It is 
already multifaceted at the national level but more so at the 
international level, where carbon dioxide sinks and forests are traded 
against requirements to lower pollution standards in taking account of 
differential obligations because of differences in economic 
development and the necessity to compensate for previous exploitation, 
etc. The actual discussions at the global level show to what extent this 
leads to international rent seeking. 
The importance of disembodied technical progress for capitalist 
growth has been mentioned as a condition for the maintenance of a 
constant capital output ratio. The other element of technical progress, 
human capital -i.e. basically human skill-is unevenly distributed 
among the working population. Specialisation implies that humans 
always have skills in some, but not all, areas of activity. In the past, 
                                                   
34 Net investment was only 21,7 % of gross investment from 2001 to 2008, the last 
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for example, machine producers had all the skills for producing 
machines for the most diverse of purposes. The Industrial Revolution 
may be considered as characterised by the combination of universally 
applicable skills in innovations which led to machine production. The 
increasing diversification of products and production processes was 
characterised by the increasing importance of activity-specific human 
skills. As a result, workers increasingly have difficulty in shifting 
from one activity to another due to the segmentation of labour markets 
(Mallet 1969: 84-95). A politically unified working class emerged as 
the result of the principally uniform requirements for labour in all 
activities. The removal of this unifying tendency has to lead to the rise 
of sectional interests. One hundred years ago, the universal mode of 
transport was dominated by the drivers of train engines, but today 
there are many type of drivers: pilots, truck drives, couriers and 
postal delivery drivers, bus drivers, etc. Contemporary information 
specialists understand only some programs and cannot deal with 
others. In the reconstruction of East Germany it became clear that 
skills are enterprise specific. Despite a similar number of years of 
training, it was more costly to combine East German l bour with 
modern technology than West German labour (Deutsches Institut für 
Wirtschaftsforschung 1992: 293). 
The homogenising mechanism resulting from a rising e titlement 
of labour and leading automatically to equilibrium between 
investment and a relatively homogeneous consumption is no longer 
the result of uncoordinated parallel activities which admittedly 
converge into equilibrium only chaotically. The attempt of labour to 
satisfy needs other than material needs, the rising importance of 
collective goods, and the fragmentation of labour have undermined 
this process. Maintaining the stability of the system requires some sort 
of political intervention and negotiation, whereas previously anything 
was acceptable. Transaction costs in negotiations require the 
narrowing down of options and therefore increasingly hierarchical 
decision making. 
We may assume that the emergence of trust to an exte t previously 
unknown in history is required for maintaining the r gulatory 
advantages of capitalism over non-capitalist modes of production.  
Whatever problems are associated with these processes of 
coordination, it can be assumed that it becomes increasingly unlikely 
they will push the economy to the point where mass incomes become 




so high that any other surplus appropriation is excluded except profit 
realised through investment spending. This is associated with market 
imperfections for differentiated goods and services through which 
oligopolistic price fixing becomes more widespread. This implies the 
emergence of financial resources quite in excess of investment which 
further multiply as shown by the recent financial crisis (Elsenhans 
2010; Baily & Elliott 2009: 5). The capitalists are freed from fierce 
competition and shift to power based strategies of surplus 
appropriation, where rivalry and political clout matter. 
There are two conclusions to be drawn from these tendencies: 
capitalist means of appropriating surplus are weakened and the 
establishment of new or complementary mechanisms have to be based 
on political negotiation in which the possibility of either side 
prevailing depend on their capacity to instrumentalise shared patterns 
of interpretation, shared values, and shared norms. Labour alone 
cannot prevail on the basis of demanding real wages but must justify 
its claims on the basis of shared ideas. Not surprisingly in this 
situation, cultural factors increasingly matter. 
Without describing the new structure which emerges, two traits 
make it appear as non-capitalist: access to surplus depends on 
positioning via socially accepted power structures. Capitalist 
competition cannot avoid the entrenchment of these power structures 
because power positions are permanently created and rei forced 
without a parallel process of their destruction comparable to the 
devaluation of already invested capital through technical progress in 
capitalism. This leads to a hierarchical macro-structure of society. 
Labour can no longer assert itself without becoming influential, if not 
hegemonic, in the cultural sphere where the necessity of surplus can 
be challenged and the criticism of wasteful consumption can be 
addressed.  
The system will tend either to a new rent-based structu e -not so 
dissimilar from the ancient tributary modes of production, despite a 
very probable ideological openness to technical progress- or become a 
labour-dominated system where labour utilizes the undeniable 
achievements of capitalism for orienting production with respect to 
results and conditions of production (environment), as well as for 
reducing alienated labour (labour supplied for the satisfaction of the 
needs of others), by further technical innovation. Whether the first 
option should be called barbarism may be debated, as different pre-





capitalist modes of production have been shown by the critics of 
Orientalism to have been quite civilised. Whether the second option 
will be achieved as a sort of an end of history may also be doubted, as 
evidence of the emergence of capitalism does not show that 
ideological hegemony is an important goal of labour if easonable 
household income targets are achieved. A sort of benign Old Chinese 
society with avenues for individual climbers might prove to be quite 
stable and considered by theorists of “the end of history”35 as the 
fulfilment of the market society where individual efforts and 
commitment matter. 
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